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STATE'fE~;T OF Kic;D OF CASE 
This is a criminal prosecution for aggra1ated assault, involving 
the shooting of the victim on the highway with enhancement of sentence 
for use of a firearm or facsimile in commission of a felony. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COl'RT 
The aggravated assault case was tried to a jury who convicted the 
Appellant of aggravated assault. The trial judge made a finding of use 
of a firearm and invoked the enhancement provision of the penaltv statute. 
From the verdict and judgment of conviction and committment on the 
enhancement statute Defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment of conviction, an order 
remanding for new trial, suppressing use of the .22 caliber pistol in 
evidence or alternately, remand for evidentiary hearing on suppression 
and/or that the committment on the enhance~ent provision of Ctah Code 
Annotated §76-3-203 be vacated. 
STATEXENT OF FACTS 
On the 20th dav of July, 1977, Clyde Davies was driving a truck 
southbound on I-15 near Santaquin, Ctah, when he was shot. The driver 
of a truck ~Gllowing him heard a loud noise at about the sane time and 
cOser~:e::i a white ':an on c'.-ie :lO-Cthbound side of the ::.i5h·11a:,·. Defendan~ 
~as stoppej a~d jetai:led ~ea 11i:lg I-15 in ~is ~hite ·ran, and a search of 
-1-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the van was conducted, turning up a .22 caliber pistol and a number of 
empty shell casings. The Defendant •;as tried and convicted of the char;c 
of aggravated assault before a jurv. The inform;Hion made no reference ,, 
the enhancement provision of the penalty statute for use of a firearm. 
The jury was not provided with a verdict form on the enhancement provisico 
and the essential elements of the crime as char8ed, did not include an 
element on the use of a firearm. .-\t sentencing, the trial judge made a 
finding that a firearm had been used and invoked the enhancement provisi0ns, 
sentencing the Defendant to two consecutive sentences of not less than 
five years in prison. 
ARGL~ENT 
I. THE SEARCH OF THE DEFE).'])NlT' S VEHICLE WAS CONDL'CTED \·?ITHOUT PROBABLE 
CAUSE, PRIOR TO ARREST, .-\ND WITHOUT THE CONSE:lt OF THE APPELLA.'./T, AND 
ALL EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN THE SEARCH SHOL'LD HAVE BEEN SL'PRESSED. 
Sometime shortly following the shooting of Mr. Davies, the Appel~nt 
was stopped on the highway and a search was conducted of his vehicle. This 
search re~ealed a .22 caliber pistol in the rear portion of the van tha: 
became the primary evidence against hi!Il in trial. '.."he problem then becomos 
to determine the authority under which the search was conducted and 
whether it meets the standards ?rescribed for warrantless searches under 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendm.ents to the Constitution. 
Searches conducted outside the judicial proc2ss •,;it:hout prior appro,·a. 
by a judge or magistra~e are, per se, unre3sonab~e ~nder the Four~h 
. .\mendrner.t, 3ub~ect on2.:: to a :et ... · specif:_cal1.y established 3.:1.d ·.Jell-d2l:~e~.::.1 
excepticns. K2.tz ·1. r_·ni:ei States, 339 '...'.S. 3..'..7, 357 19 LEd ~~ 516, 533. 
-2-
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The burden is on those seeking exemption to show the need for it. United 
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 41, 96 LEd 59, 64. 
One exception is a search incident to an arrest. In order for a 
search incident to an arrest to stand, the arresting officer must have 
sufficient probable cause to arrest the Defendant, must lawfully effectuate 
the arrest, and must place the Defendant in custody. Gustafson v. Florida, 
414 U.S. 260. While in the present case the person of the Defendant was 
seized and detained, and he may well be considered to have been in custody, 
there existed neither probable cause for an arrest nor the lawful effectuation 
of an arrest. In order to judge the probable cause for arrest, probable 
cause must be judged solely on that information and evidence available to 
the arresting officer at the time the Appellant's vehicle was stopped. The 
arresting officer may not rely upon evidence obtained in a search conducted 
after the arrest in order to provide probable cause for the arrest. Henry 
v. United States, 361 U.S. 98; Rios v. United States, 364 C.S. 253; Whiteley 
v. Warden of Wvoming State Penetentiary, 401 U.S. 560. We must, then consider 
what knowledge was available to the arresting officer when he stopped 
Appellant and "detained" him for "investigation". The officer '"as aware 
that someone (:-lr. Davies) had been injured and probably shot. He was aware 
that the shooting had taken place a short distance away on Interstate Highway 
15. He was aware that another person (''.r. Child) had heard a loud noise 
at about the same time that ~[r. Davies was shot, and that he had observed a 
white van heading the opposite direction on the Interstate. This information 
is further supported by another report of a loud noise and that a cream colored 
van was across the highway at that time. There was no information on any 
persons within the van or vans and nothing out of the ordi~ary about the 
conduct of the van or its driver or any passengers. There is not even a 
-3-
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strong inference that the shots were fired from a vehcile, let alone the 
white van. However, it is certainly reasonable that the police officers, 
upon being informed that someone had been shot and additionally advised 
that at that time a white van was across the high1o:a:1 with soeo.e corrobora~: 
in antoher report of a loud noise coupled with the ;iroxiriity of a cream ·:c: 
that the police would attempt to locate any white or cream vans in the areo 
in order to question the driver and any passengers, and at least ascer~~ 
their identity. But no magistrate would issue a warrant of arrest or 
allow a complaint to stand based upon such evidence, and accordingly, there 
was not sufficient probable cause to arrest Appellant and any search incic;·· 
to such arrest is defective and testimony with regards thereto and evidence 
located must be suppressed. 
It is additionally questionable whether the Appellant was in fact 
arrested by the officer. '.v"hen he was stopped, Officer Bradford did not ai 
him he was under arrest, but told him he was being " ... detained while we 
investic;ate the situation" (transcript pa?e 49, lines 6-7) This would sec 
to demonstrate that Officer Bradford knew there was no probable cause ford: 
arrest at that time, and did not then intend to arrest. 
Even though there was not sufficient probable cause :o arrest, this i 
I 
would not prohibit the Appellant being stopped for investigation. Emplo;·cc.: 1 
the princi;:iles of good police work, Officer Bradford knew that a driver.,: 
a ·"'hite ':an ::iay have been involved in criminal conduct. He could, there£ 
stop a white van in the area of a crime, and could conduct a search of 
the person of the ,::,=i~1er of the vehicle. Terr·; v. 1Jhio, 392 L~.s. l; ~ 
''· )lew Ycrk, 392 C.S. 40; Adao-.s -;, ·.,'illians, 407 C.S. 1-+3. 3ut the ?uC'·''' 
of this typ2 of scare'.! 11 ••• is nc~ t.) disco·;er 2·:i.2ence ~= ,:t cri:ie Ju: t: 
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allow the officer to pursue his investifation without fear of violence." 
Adams v. 1-:illiams, supra at 146. Accordingly, the scope of such a "stop and 
frisk" search is limited to the individual and such limited surroundings 
as are reasonably necessary to protect the safety of the officer. Terry v. 
Ohio, supra; Adams v. Williams, supra. The arresting officer might then search 
the person of the Appellant for weapons and look into the van to ascertain 
it held no other persons, but, the .22 caliber pistol which was discovered 
in the rear of the van, and out of sight, was well beyond the scope of such 
a search. Officer Bradford testified "I really had to look hard, but finally 
found it ... " (Transcript page 44, lines 4 and 5) There can, then, be no 
pretense that the officer's search was for the purpose of protecting his person 
and guarding against possible physical harm by the Appellant. 
Another exception allows police to make a warrantless search of a motor 
vehicle even when it is not incident to arrest, and where there may not be 
probable cause to arrest, if they have probable cause to justify the search. 
Carol v. l!nited States, 267 U.S. 132; Chambers v. ~-!aronev, 399 C.S. 42. 
While this is tantamount to an expost facto type of warrant, it is justified 
upon the transitory nature of •1ehicles. Chambers, supra. The difference in 
probable cause required for search of a vehicle is applied to the vehicle in 
much the same way probable cause for arrest is applied to an individual. In 
Chambers, the court provided that the similarity of vehicle descriptions 
including partial descriptions of the occupants, gave probable cause to search 
the vehicle. But there was a great deal more in that case to distinguish the 
vehicle from all ohters on the road besides its color and type as in the 
instant =ase. There were four persons in the suspect vehicle, four in the 
stopped 'iehicle. The clot~!ifl.g of some of the passengers ::natched that of some 
-5-
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of the suspects. But the greatest difference is that in Chambers, the 
vehicle description was of a vehicle known to have been involved in the 
crime not just in the area of the crime. 
If the description of a person conunitting a crime was broadcast, a 
person answering that description might be arrested, but if the descriptirr. 
was merely that of a person seen in the area of the crime, there would not 
be probable cause for an arrest. 
It is an exception to the requirement for probable cause for a search 
that the Defendant may consent to the conduct of the search. Davis v. Cnite: 
States, 328 U.S. 582; Zat v. United States, 328 U.S. 624; Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347. 
Officer Bradford claims that he conducted the search with the cons~t ' 
the Appellant. After stopping the Appellant, he was ordered from the v~b 1 
loud speaker, told to place his hands on the van and was searched. He ~s 
infon;ied by Officer Bradford that he was going to be "detained" and that c.i; 
van was going to be searched. (See Transcript page 4ti lines 23-2j) He was 
not advised of his rights or informed that he could refuse the search. Th1 
Appellant did not consent to the search, but merely consented to authorit:1. 
This is not consent, and cannot make an unlac,;ful search lawful. Bu'.Ilper '1 · 
North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 20 LEd 2 797. 
The .22 caliber pistol was seized in an unlawful search and shou~ ~ 
suppressed, and Appellant's conviction reversed or remanded for an evident:,· 
hearing to determine if the evidence of the search should be suopressei. 
II. UTAH CODE A:l~CTATED §76-3-203 APPLES TWO S'OPAP.UE SE:iTE:iCES ~''R THE 
SA:rE CRI'.1I:iAL ACT' A.'iD' nlEREFORE' L!POSES :!Oc3LE ?lciISHYEC!T' ?Rt'HI31'S'l 
BY THE FIFTH .\XD ?Ot:?::::::E:;TH .-\.'!Ec!DME:;TS TO 7'.-lE CO'lSTIT1:T:::o:; '.JF CHE c:lT-E' 
STATES. 
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It is long established doctrine that the Fifth ~mendment not only 
protects against being twice tried for the same offense, but prohibits 
double punishment. Ex Parte Lange, 18 Wall 163, 21 LEd 872; United 
States v. Ewell, J8J U.S. 116; c;orth Carolina v. Pearce, 395 l:.S. 711. 
This is applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment Benton v. 
~arvland, 395 U.S. 784. 
In providing a statutory scheme for enhancement of sentence for use of 
a firearm in the commission of a crime Utah Code Annotated 76-3-203 
chooses rather than enlarging the basic sentence to provide for an entirely 
separate and distinct sentence. One that does not begin to run until the 
Defendant has completed serving the sentence for the crime itself. 
There is some precedence that multiple punishments may consititutionally 
be imposed as the consequence of a single criminal, but only if they 
constitute separate statutory offenses. Blockburger v. United States, 
234 U.S. 299. In the instant case, the Appellant was charged and tried 
for only one statutory offense, but was sentenced to two separate and 
consecutive sentences of not to exceed five years, and the second sentence 
of not to exceed five years should be vacated. 
III. FAILURE TO PROVIDE RL.\SONA.BLE ~OTICE OF THE INTENT TO I~-VOKE THE 
E:)<1lANCE)!DiT PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE . .\..'iNOTATED §76-3-203 DENIED APPELL.AXT 
DUE PROCESS OF LA~. 
At no point in the proceeding o.rraignment, preliminary hearing, district 
court arraignment or trial did the Appellant receive any notice or warning 
of either the exi3tence of or any intention ~f the state to proceed upon 
the firearm E=nhance!!lent provisivns of Utan Code --'nnctated §76-3-203, in 
~ace, che record is 3ilent ~ith regari to ei:~er th~s section 0r its special 
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potential until sentencing. Accordingly, the Def~ndant •,·3s afforded no 
reasonable notice and opportunity either at trial or later to confront 
the issues involved in the enhancement statute, or to plan his strateg~ 
and bargain plea based on a realization of the full potential of his 
exposure. Failure to provide the Defendant reasonable notice is a deniai 
of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth ·'°'mendments of the Constit•ct'.· 
of the United States. Ovler v. Boles, 368 C.S. 448. 
IV. FAILURE TO PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY FOR A FINDING SPECIFICALLY ON THE L"SE 
OF A FIRE~l OR FACSI~1ILE AS OPPOSED TO A DEADLY WEAPON EITHER THROUGH .'LI 
ELE~1ENT TO THE OFFDJSE OR VERDICT CONSTITCTES FAILCRE TO I:.:VOKE THAT SECT' 
The State, through the County Attorney, has a ~road discretion in 
determing what a !)efendant will have to ans;.·er. Each criminal act is usus:: 
surrounded 1Cith a myriad of potentials for criminal prosecution. The Couc.t 
Attorney is charged with reviewing these potentials, ?.nd charging those~~,~: 
can best be proved and that best fit the situation. It is an affirmati•• 
duty on the part of the State to advise the Defendant of those c~car~es it 
intends to prove. 
The State of California, T,,:hich has d similar use :Jf a firParJJ. st3.t'.:::: 
(California Penal Code Section 12022.5) has ruled :hat unless the Stace 
takes affirmative action to indicate its choi~e to pursue the enhanceme~t 
provision at trial, it ma:1 ~ot be invoked at sente~cing and is wa::.~ed. 
People v. ~ajera, 503 ?2d 1353 (Ca:. i972) (c;uotirtg from ?eople ·;, 3~.;:-. 
99 Cal '<.ptr 681, 691, S. Cal. A?P· 3d 736, 30:) t'1e Court states: 
"It seeri.s ~ot unr-e3.sondDl~ to hoL: t'.-!at ::he fa::.lure 
cf :he ?rcsec_:icn t~ re~~est eithe~ tie ~2:essar:· 
~ur:7 inst-r 1...1..:.ti0n, or :i1e ;u:mission 0:: :'he re·-~ 1~is:te 
-3-
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special ·1erdict, should be taken as an indication 
that Section 12022.5 has not been invoked." Id at 1358. 
The language of Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203 is specific in its 
requirement for a "finding" by the jury that a "firearm or facsimile or 
representation of a firearm" was utilized in the corunission or furtherance 
of the crime. This creates a new and additional element that is an 
es~ential element to the application of the enhancement provision. When 
the court in the instant case instructed the jury in its Instruction No. 
no element on the use of a firearm or facsimile thereof ~~s included. 
The jury was required to find only that a dangerous weapon as required by 
the aggrevated assault statute was used. Utah Code Annotated §76-5-103. 
Failure to so instruct denied the Appellant the right to a finding he 
was entitled to by the statute before its full force and effect could be 
Drought to bare against him. 
The case should either be remanded for new trial on all issues or the 
State deeoed to have waived invokation of the enhancement provision and 
the sentence thereon declared void and vacated. 
V. CT.\H CODE . .\..'lc!OTATED §76-3-203 CREATES A SEPAP~HE A:lD uISTI~Gt:ISHA5LE 
OFFD<SE WHICH \fl'ST BE PLE'.l AS A SEPXUTE CHARGE TO BE IXVOKED. 
The enhance~ent provision ::ir use of a f irear:i is contained within 
the ?enalty ?rovision o~ the cri~inal code, and f~rther liste~ as an adjunct 
:o :he description of the ~elony involved. The ?revisions of that Section 
enr.a~ce::ent ?C~t~,:.n ::-f :.he 3t2t·Jt~ ·.,:culd seem to ?ro•1ide a separate and 
-9-
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distinguishable criminal offense. 
The Federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Acts of 1968, 
provides enhancement of sentence for being armed with a firearm in the 
commission of a federal crime. This provision, like Utah's, being found. 
within the punishment of the code. 18 U.S.C. §924(c). Although the federa: 
law is distinguishable in that it enlarges the basic sentence rather than 
providing a separate sentence, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
construed the federal law to provide a separate offense which must be 
charged as a separate count to the information. United States v. Sudduth, 
457 F2d 1198, 25 ALR Fed. 671. Further, holding that an enhanced sentence 
predicated on the firearm provision alone could not be imposed on an ind~t·l 
I 
charging only an independent felony. United States v. Vigil, 458 F2d 385 
(CA 10 1972). The Federal Omnibus Act has also been construed to create 
separate crimes by the Second Circuit in United States v. Ramirez, 482 FM 
807 (CA 2 1973)cert den 414 U.S. 1070. 
It would seem that the legislature in setting an additional sentence 
separate and apart from that carried by the basic charge probably envisione' 
a separate crime as the federal law has been interpreted, one that would ha·,, 
to be charged before it could be invo~ed, one that would have to provide a 
Defendant of reasonable notice of its intended use as required 'oy ~ 
Boles, supra, and one upon which the Defendant is entitled to a specific 
jury instruction and elements for the cri~e and a verdict ~y the 
jurv on t'1at issue. ..\ccordingly, the sen:ence of the Appellar.t on the 
enhancement s ta :ute s'.-iould be vacated. 
-10-
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VI. TiiE flCIDDIGS OF FACT REQCIRED BY CTAH CODE AO.'°:'iOTATED §76-3-203(3) 
WAS :L.llJE BY THE JUDGE RATHER THA.'i THE JCRY AXD DE~IED APPELLA.''11 HIS RIGHT 
TO TRIAL BY JURY. 
The enhancement portion of Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203 requires 
that there be a finding by the trier of fact with regards to the utilization 
of the firearm. It is well settled that in any case involving criminal 
conduct where a jury is present, that the finder of fact is the jury. 
In the instant case, as discussed above, there was no element included in 
the charge that made a separate and distinguishable finding that a firearm 
or facsimile was usec, neither was there a verdict, special or otherwise, 
employed to make a finding as required by the statute. This seems to be 
recognized by the trial judge in the language of the comrnittment. The 
cornmittment of the Court issued on the 28th day of October, 1977, sentences 
the Defendant to a term in the Utah State Prison of not to exceed five years 
for the underlying ch~rge of aggrevated assault, but goes on: "in addition 
thereto, the Court finds that a firearm was used in the commission of the 
crime, and therefore, under the provisions of §76-3-203(3) of the criminal 
code, the ]efendant is sentenced to an additional term not to exceed five 
years. Sentence to run consecutively, net concurrently." (emphasis added) 
Accordingly, the Court by its own language has made its own independent 
finding of what must be a specific element of the crime, and has thereby 
2 
usurped the function and duty of the jury. People v. ~Tajera, 503 "wd 1353 (Cal 
1972)Appellant was not provided a finding by the jury on an essential issue 
0f :act, this finding cannot be made by the Court no matter how compelling 
it may seem and may not be inferred from the general verdict of the jury. 
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G 
Appellant was entitled to a specific finding which finding was denied 
him and his conviction should be reversed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
I 
The search of Defendant's vehicle was in violation of his rights unde: 
the Fourth Amendment. The gun seized in the search should have been 
suppressed, and Defendant's conviction for aggrevated assault should be 
reversed. 
Alternatley, as the issue of protection against unlawful search and 
seizure is so fundemental to American jurisprudence and as the issue was 
not clearly dealt with in the lower court, the case should be remanded fM 
an evidentiary hearing on the suppression issue. 
II 
The enhancement provisions of Ltah Code Annotated §76-3-203 is an J 
comrnittcl unconstitutional imposition of double punishment and Defendant's 
therefore, should be reversed. 
Alternately, the failure to plead or otherwise put the question of 
the enhancement ;irovision at issue 1-·as either a choice not to invoke by 
the State or denies Ap[Jellant due [Jrocess of law. It was improper fort~"' 
judge on his ow"TJ. to invoke the ?ro 1 isicn, mat<e his '.Jh"TI finding exclusive :·i 
the jury and impose sentence thereon. The sentence on the enhancement 
provisicn s~ould be reversed and vacated. 
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